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Abstract
Clients may feel trapped into sharing their private digital data with insurance companies to get a desired insurance product 
or premium. However, private insurance must collect some data to offer products and premiums appropriate to the client’s 
level of risk. This situation creates tension between the value of privacy and common insurance business practice. We argue 
for three main claims: first, coercion to share private data with insurers is pro tanto wrong because it violates the autonomous 
choice of a privacy-valuing client. Second, we maintain that irrespective of being coerced, the choice of accepting digital 
surveillance by insurers makes it harder for the client to protect his or her autonomy (and to act spontaneously and authenti-
cally). The violation of autonomy also makes coercing customers into digital surveillance pro tanto morally wrong. Third, 
having identified an economically plausible process involving no direct coercion by insurers, leading to the adoption of digital 
surveillance, we argue that such an outcome generates further threats against autonomy. This threat provides individuals with 
a pro tanto reason to prevent this process. We highlight the freedom dilemma faced by regulators who aim to prevent this 
outcome by constraining market freedoms and argue for the need for further moral and empirical research on this question.
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Introduction
Insurance is a genuinely data-driven industry and shows a 
keen interest in many applications of big data analytics and 
artificial intelligence, such as telematics in car insurance, 
fraud detection capabilities, or quantified-self applications 
for health and life insurances. Those technical developments 
are triggering a transformation of the insurance industry and 
allow dealing with risks that were previously considered 
uninsurable, such as earnings losses and cash flow volatility. 
The availability of large amounts of data that can be used to 
assess, select, price, predict, and prevent risks is key in this 
development.
A concern in the public debate is the fear of losing pri-
vacy when more and more customer data are made avail-
able for risk modeling (and many more applications of big 
data-driven modeling). This article contributes to this debate 
by suggesting a model for an ethical assessment of privacy 
risks when insurance uses big data analytics from digital 
surveillance sources. The focus will be on private insurance 
for natural persons, not (compulsory) social insurance or 
insurance for companies. The insurance case is especially 
interesting because, unlike other commercial applications 
of big data analytics such as personalized marketing or pric-
ing, insurance companies have an ethically justified need to 
obtain client data to calculate risk-adequate premiums and 
prevent moral hazard. This need makes it difficult to set the 
limits of privacy protection: obviously, one cannot simply 
demand that insurers stop analyzing all the data from their 
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clients relevant for predicting the insured risk.1 So, where 
should one place the limit?
In this essay, we argue for three claims: first, coercion to 
share private digital data with insurers is pro tanto wrong. 
Coercion, which leads to the violation of the autonomy 
of the client, is wrong because it disrespects autonomy. 
Because coercion fails to respect the autonomy of the client, 
we maintain that this is pro tanto wrong even if the client 
(who accepted sharing data to avoid paying higher prices) 
eventually ends up with a life that is better in some respect 
(for example, healthier), thanks to the coerced choice.
Second, we maintain that sharing data for insurance sur-
veillance in some domain (for example, social media) may 
reduce the client’s autonomy in that domain, may oppose the 
client’s domain-specific preferences for privacy, and may 
facilitate further coercion of the client.
Third, we argue that it is economically possible for a 
market to evolve in a direction deprived of privacy-friendly 
options, even in the absence of threats. This evolution 
exposes the client to coercion, generating further risk to the 
client, to be pro tanto wronged.
We conclude that within an ethical framework that val-
ues autonomy, a countervailing reason is needed to justify 
allowing insurers to coerce clients into accepting some 
form of surveillance from digital devices. Finally, even in 
the absence of direct coercion from insurers, governments 
intending to protect the conditions of autonomy have pro 
tanto reasons to regulate this market.
We develop our argument by first explaining our fram-
ing assumptions, scope, and methodology (“Motivation, 
Framing Assumptions, Scope, and Methodology” sec-
tion). In “Threats, conditional warnings, and conditional 
offers” section, we discuss the distinction, fundamental for 
our argument, between what we call ‘threats,’ ‘warnings’ 
and ‘offers,’ based on Robert Nozick’s account of coercion 
(Nozick 1969). In “Distinguishing threats from warnings and 
offers in the insurance domain” section, we use these distinc-
tions in describing different types of interactions between 
insurers and their clients. “Privacy, autonomy, and the harm 
of being coerced into surveillance” section explains different 
ways in which privacy relates to autonomy, highlighting the 
different ways in which threats, offers and warnings affect 
autonomy, spontaneity, and authenticity. “Privacy erosion 
from non-coercive insurance market transactions” section 
argues that even non-coercive market transactions between 
insurers and their clients, leading to the acceptance of digital 
surveillance, can be inimical autonomy, which provides a 
pro tanto reason to avoid them. “Further research” section 
highlights questions for further research opened by our anal-
ysis. There is a brief conclusion.
Our account analyses potential violations of autonomy 
and losses of clients’ freedom deriving from insurers’ psy-
chological threats against clients who do not share their 
data or who do not want to adopt risk mitigation measures 
inferred from surveillance data. This autonomy-based argu-
ment vis-à-vis coercion is a significant innovation because 
it expands the set of deontological moral elements, such 
as transparency or informed consent, considered in the lit-
erature about privacy and big data (Alder 1998; Ashworth 
and Free 2006; Hoven et al. 2012; ICDPPC 2018; Privacy 
International & Article 19 2018; Christen et al. 2019; Jobin 
et al. 2019; Nill et al. 2019). No account of coercion by psy-
chological threats is found in most ethical analyses of either 
privacy or personalized pricing (Seele et al. 2019). The 
analysis of the concept of psychological threats (or ‘threats’ 
in the following explanations; see also Sect. 2 for the defini-
tion of the term ‘threat’) is important because it provides a 
treatment of coercion, one of the most puzzling and contro-
versial concepts in our moral repertoire. Conceptual puzzles 
about coercion are also widespread outside philosophy, for 
example, in business (Eabrasu 2019), law (Honoré 1990) 
and, particularly, in data protection law.2 We focus here on 
coercion involving “a form of interference that necessarily 
involves the use of conditional proposals that render certain 
options ineligible for rational choice” (Pugh 2020, p. 92). 
There are two reasons to focus on this form of coercion. 
First, it is philosophically interesting because in coercion by 
threats, the will of the agent whose autonomy is violated is 
actively, not passively, involved in generating the undesired 
outcome, and yet the action counts as non-autonomous. Sec-
ond, coercion by threats is not as visible, easy to detect, and 
when it is not recognized as such, controversial, as coercion 
by direct physical force.
We stress, however, that our analysis of threats is not 
based on the claim that this is the only right approach, and 
we explore the potential for moral wrongness that even non-
coercive market transactions involving digital surveillance 
generate. The paper concludes that non-coercive privacy 
erosion through accepted conditional offers and the subse-
quent market adaptations (that in our analysis produce condi-
tional warnings) are also morally problematic when privacy 
losses expose the client to further coercion risks.
2 See, for instance, the question of ‘conditionality’ in the satisfaction 
of the informed consent criterion in the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation that consent shall be “freely given” (Art. 29 Working Party 
2018).
1 For example, the NGO Privacy International calls for challenging 
corporate data exploitation. If that is meant as preventing industries 
from “look[ing] for patterns and similarities, […] and mak[ing] deci-
sions about us” (Privacy International n.d.), this could, in principle, 
apply to any form of risk assessment performed by insurers.
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Motivation, Framing Assumptions, Scope, 
and Methodology
The insurance industry operates in a highly regulated envi-
ronment, constrained by privacy and data protection laws, 
such as the General Data Protection Regulation in the Euro-
pean Union, anti-discrimination law, and possible regulation 
of insurance premiums; regulations also differ largely across 
countries. However, ethical questions have emerged that go 
beyond the realm of legal compliance and can damage the 
reputation and ethical characteristics of insurance companies 
if left unattended. For example, is the datafication of insur-
ance an offense on people’s privacy?
Traditional insurance data is about standard demograph-
ics and the kind of events where insurance must pay, for 
example, the number of previous car accidents with civil 
liability in car insurance or the nature of illnesses in health 
insurance. Insurers have used this type of information for 
more than a century to offer competitive prices to low-risk 
clients and avert adverse selection (Stiglitz 1983; Wilkie 
1997; Heath 2007; Palmer 2007). Insurance companies 
increasingly use information from what we define as digital 
surveillance, namely information about behavioral features 
that may be predictive of the risk insured against, where the 
relevant information is presumptively contained by digital 
data, or more precisely, the client’s digital phenotype (Loi 
2019). A feature of digital surveillance-based methods is 
that they attempt to identify patterns relevant to risk in the 
digital phenotype; that is, all possible data associated with 
an individual provide potential proxies of his or her risk 
while lacking direct access to individual behavior, except 
as reflected in data. As Loi (2019) argues, when machine 
learning models are applied to data produced for other pur-
poses, risk factors identification is heavily influenced by the 
availability of the data. Such availability is, in turn, heavily 
influenced by capabilities of data production (for example, 
what data already exist and can be easily collected) that 
are not initially designed for the sake of measuring insur-
ance risk. Data from social media or fitness sensors might 
be used. Thus, what determines the types of behaviors and 
choices that get penalized or incentivized by such models is 
the nature of the data-generating infrastructure, at least as 
much as the causal mechanism linking behavior and risk.
For example, some reports suggest that the US-based life 
insurance company John Hancock intends to sell policies 
only to customers who use wearable devices and smart-
phones to track fitness and health (Barlyn 2018). Such 
information may substitute for or, more likely, complement 
traditional risk-relevant information such as age or gender. 
Although the distinction between a surveillance-based insur-
ance product and a traditional product is not sharp, it will 
guide our reflection about the different ethical profiles of 
such products.
The current insurtech landscape, mainly driven by tech-
nology start-ups, is increasingly creating business model 
innovations that include surveillance features: vehicle tele-
matics, environmental sensors, home security, wearables, 
chronic condition management, and preventative healthcare. 
In such policies, risk mitigation options may be considered 
for adjusting underwriting dynamically and personalizing 
premiums (Braun and Schreiber 2017). Consider, for exam-
ple, the “pay-as-you-drive” business model for car insur-
ance, whereby telematics devices in cars record drivers’ data 
from which temporal, geographic, distance, acceleration, 
and braking patterns can be inferred (Braun and Schreiber 
2017). The analysis of these individual patterns helps the 
insurer to assess the client’s risk and charge an appropriate 
premium.
As anticipated, the analysis revolves around the morally 
charged concepts of threats and coercion. These are some of 
the most complex and controversial concepts in ethics, and 
the risk of equivocation is high. For rigor’s sake, we rely on 
a well-defined and widely discussed substantive philosophi-
cal account of coercion. We make the relationship between 
privacy, autonomy, well-being, and real freedom explicit.
The concept of coercion by threats is one of the hard-
est to analyze in terms of the involvement of the will of 
coerced. Few philosophers today discuss coercion under-
stood as interventions in which the agent is clearly acted 
upon (as opposed to forced to act) (Pugh 2020, p. 91). It 
would be misleading to consider “coercion by threats” as 
analogous to coercion by direct physical force. Coercion 
by direct physical force is the kind of coercion that follows 
from directly applying physical force on individuals, as a 
police officer does when handcuffing a suspect. The idea 
of coercion by direct physical force is obviously irrelevant 
here because insurers do not apply direct physical force on 
their clients. Threatening physical harm may loosely be 
defined as coercion by force, but it is achieved by altering 
options: physical force is threatened, not directly exercised 
as in direct physical coercion. Consider, for example, a bur-
glar who coerces someone to turn over a wallet by threat-
ening to take the individual’s life. A victim who obeys has 
been coerced by the threat, however, not by direct physical 
force. The burglar need not even touch the victim; hence the 
coercion works psychologically, not physically. (We refer to 
threats that alter the subject’s options as psychological, in 
this sense.) In coercion by threats, the agent is always forced 
to act, not acted upon.3 The will of the coerced individual is 
3 The distinction between even violent coercion by threats and coer-
cion by direct force is established, philosophically. For example, 
Aquinas discussed two ways in which violence undercuts voluntari-
ness: (a) when used directly against the body, “a man may be dragged 
by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be 
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active, not passive, and it eventually determines the action. 
This outcome is more puzzling from the point of view of 
voluntariness than a passive condition in which the will of 
the individual is not exercised at all.
Deception and manipulation, while arguably equally 
hard to define, are less puzzling from the point of view of 
autonomy. Deception and manipulation quite intuitively 
undermine the rationality of the agent’s decision making: 
deception, in so far as the agent is made to act upon false 
beliefs, and manipulation, in so far as the agent is made to 
act upon preferences that are not authentically the agent’s 
own (Faden and Beauchamp 1986; Pugh 2020).
In contrast, in coercion by threats, the coerced agent may 
also be well-informed and acting upon authentic personal 
preferences. For example, a subject who is told that he or 
she will be killed unless he or she hands over a wallet may 
be acting upon an authentic valuing of life above money.
Philosophical accounts need to wrestle with this paradox-
ical idea: how can an action be voluntary, aligned with the 
agent’s preferences, and yet not autonomous. A further con-
straint is the need to identify an Archimedean point between 
two logically possible extremes: (1) the view that regards the 
sharing of personal information as coerced whenever the 
data controller requests the data as a condition of providing 
a benefit of any kind to the data subject; (2) the arguably 
more common-sense view that regards the choice to share 
data as uncoerced whenever the subject can afford to act 
otherwise (for example, by avoiding the transaction with 
the data controller) without suffering significant harm as a 
result. Notice that what counts as “significant” is notoriously 
problematic (Wertheimer 2014). So, we need an account that 
avoids presupposing we agree on what it means to suffer 
“significant harm.”
Both Wertheimer’s and Nozick’s views (along with sev-
eral variations and tweaks of such views in the literature) 
satisfy this constraint. Here we focus on one aspect of Rob-
ert Nozick’s philosophical account of coercion by threats 
(Nozick 1969). Nozick talks about a normally expected base-
line and mentions two possible interpretations of normally 
expected. We shall call the first the status quo interpretation. 
It refers to what is statistically normal or what a reasonable 
individual would expect to happen by deeming it probable. 
In an unjust world, something can be normal in this sense 
and yet be immoral. The alternative is the normative inter-
pretation that Nozick also explores (Nozick claims that both 
can be used, depending on the context)4 and that Wertheimer 
(2014) defends as being the only correct option. In the latter 
formulation, the baseline of coercion is defined by the moral 
rights of the target of the threat. Applied to the case at hand, 
the proposal that the client pay a higher premium to avoid 
data surveillance counts as a threat only if the insurer makes 
the recipient worse off than the recipient ought to be, given 
his or her moral rights (Wertheimer 2014).
Here, we follow Nozick while also arguing that a status 
quo baseline account is more suitable to this context. We 
find the normative baseline account to be problematic for 
an analysis of threats by private insurers. It seems safe for 
us to assume that most insurance clients do not have a moral 
right to obtain the products offered by private insurance at a 
given price (excluding health insurance covering important 
health needs from the scope of this argument).5 Adopting 
the Wertheimer’s view of threats makes it almost trivial to 
show that insurers who demand higher prices from clients 
not sharing data are not threatening the clients, and that the 
clients do not count as coerced when they share their data. 
The only realistic situation in which a client could accuse 
an insurer of having obtained data via a threat is when the 
insurer makes a promise to the client that the prices will 
be stable, which the insurer then violates. (Such a promise 
will create at least a prima facie moral entitlement to its 
fulfillment by the insurer.) That point of view clearly lim-
its the range of coercive threats by insurers to very special 
cases and, in our view, makes an analysis of the condition-
ality of premiums with respect to data in insurance quite 
uninteresting.
We do not aim to bring the contemporary debate on the 
baseline for coercive threats to an end (Anderson 2017; 
Eabrasu 2019; Pugh 2020; Sachs 2013), but we observe 
that Wertheimer’s account is vulnerable to significant objec-
tions, and Nozick’s view is not. For example, Wertheimer’s 
account cannot explain the common-sense view that if a 
justly imprisoned prisoner is told that he or she will have 
entertainment privileges withdrawn if he or she tries to 
4 Nozick (1969) claims that, when the status quo and the moral base-
line diverge, we should adopt the baseline that the coerced individual 
himself or herself would prefer to be adopted. Our argument for the 
status quo baseline can be regarded as an argument that the client 
would prefer a status quo baseline.
5 It may still be claimed that Wertheimerian threats arise out of a 
generic entitlement of individuals to be insured, without a corre-
sponding perfect duty by insurers to be the agents providing insur-
ance. If that generic entitlement to be insured is understood as an 
entitlement to social insurance, we object that socializing all insur-
ance products currently in the market (that is, beyond health and 
unemployment or a few other forms of insurance meeting people’s 
urgent needs) does not appear to be plausible. In other words, it is 
implausible that the state should tax citizens to socialize the insur-
ance costs of the theft of expensive phones, or holidays in dangerous 
places.
Footnote 3 (continued)
dragged of his own will” (Aquinas 1920, sec. I.II Q6 A4), and (b) 
when a threat of violence causes one to act from fear, or to avoid that 
violence, which, in Aquinas’ view, does not make the act fully invol-
untary (Aquinas 1920, sec. I.II Q6 A6; see Anderson 2017, sec. 1.2).
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escape, this counts as a (potentially coercive) threat, even if 
no prisoner has a right to such privileges (Olsaretti 1998). 
Given the contextual justification provided above, exploring 
the Nozick approach appears justified.
Threats, Conditional Warnings, 
and Conditional Offers
According to Nozick (1969, pp. 441–45),6 P coerces Q if 
and only if
1. P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A;
2. P communicates a claim to Q;
3. P’s claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will 
bring about some consequence that would make Q’s A-
ing less desirable to Q than Q’s not A-ing;
4. P’s claim is credible to Q;
5. Q does not do A;
6. Part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to lessen the likeli-
hood that P will bring about the consequence announced 
in (3).
This definition provides an initial (and as argued shortly, 
imperfect) set of necessary and sufficient conditions to deter-
mine whether, and if so when, an insurance company’s pre-
mium change is a coercive threat.
Following Nozick, we distinguish between threats, on the 
one hand, and conditional offers (hereinafter: offers) and 
conditional (non-threatening) warnings (hereinafter: warn-
ings). To distinguish the three, one can provide the example 
of a factory owner facing the results of a referendum on 
whether employees should be represented by a union. Sup-
pose that the owner warns the workers that, if the union 
wins the election, the factory will be closed (Nozick 1969, 
p. 453). This communication is a warning if the owner has 
reasons to close the factory independent of the intention to 
make the trade union alternative worse for the workers. For 
example, the factory would operate at a loss after satisfying 
all constraints unions are known to impose on such firms. 
The owner has an independent reason to close the factory; 
namely, he or she does not want to own an unprofitable busi-
ness. A similar situation represents a threat if the owner 
prefers non-unionized workers and threatens to close the 
factory for strategic reasons: the owner has no conclusive 
reason to close the factory but for making joining the trade 
union less attractive for the workers.7 In a threat, the owner 
closes conditionally in order to worsen the alternatives for 
the workers. In a conditional warning, this is not true. The 
difference between threats and warnings ultimately comes 
down to this: in threats, the consequence produced by P is 
intended to make one of Q’s options less desirable, while 
warnings describe the consequence that makes such option 
less desirable, but the consequence is not intended to exist 
for that purpose. Clearly, when P threatens Q, consequences 
wanted by P are intended to make one of Q’s options less 
desirable as a way to influence Q’s actions.8
A review of conditions 1–6 reveals that they are ambigu-
ous between threats, conditional offers or conditional warn-
ings. This ambiguity is corrected by rewriting 3 as 3*:
3* P’s claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will 
bring about some consequence that would make Q’s A-ing 
less desirable to Q than Q’s not A-ing, Q’s available options 
are made worse (from Q’s point of view) by P’s decision 
to bring about such consequence, and the consequence is 
intended by P to make A-ing less desirable.9
The first part of the addition (Q’s available options are 
made worse) and the last part (the consequence is intended 
by P to make A-ing less desirable) are intended to distin-
guish threats from offers and warnings, respectively. Con-
cerning the former, to determine whether Q’s options are 
made better or worse as a result of P’s decision to bring 
about such consequence, we rely here on the status quo base-
line, not the moral baseline, as argued above. One consid-
ers what is normal in the sense that it would be reasonably 
considered probable. We shall consider in the next section 
how this condition applies to the insurance case.
We now show that in the case of a threat of P against Q, as 
defined by 1–6 with 3*, Q’s real freedom (Van Parijs 1995) 
is reduced. A loss of real freedom follows from eliminating 
options that the threat target values from the set of all feasi-
ble options (real freedom, unlike negative freedom, also con-
siders how an individual’s valuable options depend on the 
available resources, besides laws and other forms of coer-
cion). Based on this definition, a subject who keeps access 
to all the old options is never made less free by the addition 
of further options. Moreover, a subject who faces a change 
of any existing options with a better option (from the sub-
ject’s own point of view) is not made less free. By contrast, 
coercive threats “take away the most preferred conjunctive 
6 These conditions are not literal citations of those Nozick discusses 
but are intended to capture the core elements of his account.
7 Or at least to produce a profit equivalent to the wage earned to 
manage a similar company plus an appropriate risk premium for the 
equity invested in the company.
8 Even if this intention may not be evident in the way they are 
announced.
9 So, why not define a threat as harm induced “in order to get Q to 
do A”? Because, in the example of the researchers threatening the life 
of research subjects unless they hand over a wallet, for the sake of 
studying how they respond (Nozick 1969), the intention is not that Q 
is coerced to do A (for example, pay the money) but that Q responds 
in any way to the threat, so that Q produces interesting data. This still 
counts as a threat.
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choice from the option set” (Pugh 2020, p. 107). Threats 
reduce freedom by eliminating at least a preferred conjunc-
tive choice, such as “working at this company and joining a 
trade union,” from the available options set, and substituting 
with a less valued one (such as working in this company and 
not joining a trade union or joining a trade union and not 
working in this company).
In the case of a conditional warning, the target of com-
munication is simply made aware of this unfreedom, that is, 
the fact that the most preferred conjunctive choice from the 
option set is not possible. Crucially, however, this unfreedom 
does not exist because P intends to make one of Q’s alterna-
tives (for example, joining the trade union) less desirable. 
For example, P’s announces that the factory will be closed if 
the workers are unionized, but P does not intend to close the 
factory in order to eliminate some workers’ most preferred 
conjunctive choice.
This combination of the impossibility of Q’s preferred 
conjunctive choice and the fact that P intends the conse-
quence to make one of Q’s options less desirable is neces-
sary for an announcement to be a threat. That is not true of 
warnings, where the consequence brought about by P does 
not have that purpose. It is also not true of offers, as we shall 
see next. As the argument at the end of this section shows, 
this definition makes coercion by threat a pro tanto wrong 
because it violates autonomy.10 As will be explained shortly, 
violating autonomy requires an intentional limitation of free-
dom, where freedom considers the options preferred by the 
subject of the threat.
One fundamental implication of this definition is that 
a consequence that P must produce, because it is legally 
or morally required, cannot be a threat. The reason is that 
the legal or moral requirement gives P sufficient reason to 
produce that consequence, so the consequence cannot be 
described as produced for the sake of making one option 
less desirable. That is also true when P, in fact, also wants 
to make one option less desirable. An example by Nozick 
(1969) helps clarify this point. Suppose that a teacher, who 
is legally required to assign grades based on a given scor-
ing algorithm, tells the students, “if you do not study more, 
you will get bad grades.” This, intuitively, counts as a (non-
threatening) warning if the teacher does not care about what 
his or her students do. But it still counts as a warning, not a 
threat, when the teacher desires that his or her students will 
study more. Furthermore, it still counts as a warning, not a 
threat, if a teacher has legal discretionary power to give the 
grades he or she believes appropriate but believes that he or 
she is morally required to give low grades to students who 
do not know the subject enough.
An offer differs from a threat because it announces a 
consequence that makes the target better off (Nozick 1969; 
Frankfurt 1988; Wertheimer 2014) (‘better off’ meaning 
here: offers an option that the target prefers). In the employ-
er’s case, this would be an owner who offers to raise worker 
salaries, conditionally on workers not voting to join the 
union. In this case, the owner does not eliminate the option 
(being a union member, keeping one’s job), but adds a new 
conjunctive option (not being a unionized shop, getting an 
unexpected salary raise), including at least one welcomed 
element to the original option set. The option set of the target 
is intentionally manipulated, but the subject does not have 
less real freedom relative to the normally expected course 
of events.11
There is a debate in the literature on whether offers can 
be coercive, and, if so, what makes them so (Anderson 
2017). It is not intuitive that conditional offers are coercive 
as such. If all conditional offers are coercive, then every 
employer coerces his or her employees (“I will pay you only 
if you work for me”), and every employee coerces his or 
her employers (“I will work for you only if you pay me”). 
The plausibility of this idea is related to our intuitions about 
human autonomy. Our assessment (which we cannot defend 
fully in this context) is that offers cannot violate the auton-
omy of the target, as long as it is still in the target’s power to 
ignore the enticement originating from the offer (Frankfurt 
1988).12 Provided that the target has the real option to ignore 
the enticement originating from the offer, accepting an offer 
is not tantamount to being coerced.
Coercion by threats (as defined here) is pro tanto morally 
wrong because it violates a person’s autonomy (Blake 2001). 
The idea that autonomy deserves respect reflects one morally 
important aspect of how we treat (some) moral subjects,13 
11 Suppose that subject P can go to two ice-cream shops: A = [straw-
berry, pistachio, chocolate] and B = [strawberry, vanilla, banana]. P 
values pistachio and chocolate but does not value vanilla or banana. 
We consider P’s freedom to be greater in A, even though the two ice-
cream shops contain the same number of options, because the options 
in ice-cream shop A are those that the subject values.
12 This may be false if such thing as an ‘intrinsically irresistible’ 
offer exists, or if the subject is deprived of the minimal psychologi-
cal conditions necessary to be in control of his or her choice when 
facing the offer. For example, P makes it impossible or really hard for 
Q to focus on anything but the enticement, by invading P’s environ-
ment with a communication that reminds P of the offer. This would 
not turn the offer into a threat, but it would violate autonomy none-
theless. We believe that this is an extreme case and not very relevant 
to the case at hand.
13 We do not rule out the possibility of moral subjects that are not 
human agents and that are moral subjects by virtue of their sentience 
and their capacity to feel pain and pleasure.
10 Kushner (2019) has defended the claim that coercion is a pro 
tanto wrong. Kushner’s view is compatible with our view of coer-
cion; that coercion is a pro tanto wrong because it violates a person’s 
autonomy. His account does not require the autonomy-based account. 
Kushner only aims to be agnostic with respect to substantive explana-
tions of the wrongness of coercion.
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that is, as agents in their own right, showing proper respect 
for their full nature as agents. Autonomy “[…] demands that 
the set of options provide adequate materials within which 
to construct a plan of life that can be understood as chosen 
rather than as forced upon us from without” (Blake 2001, p. 
269). Coercion violates the autonomy of its target because 
it intentionally reduces the target’s freedom (Blake 2001, p. 
272) for the sake of influencing the chosen outcome. That is 
not true of either offers and warnings. Coercion is the result 
of a threat that has worked as intended.
Distinguishing Threats from Warnings 
and Offers in the Insurance Domain
Suppose that many low-risk clients have accepted offers 
from insurtech start-up companies to share their data in 
exchange for better prices, also accepting terms and condi-
tions where the clients get discounts if they act in ways that 
reduce risk, for example, exercise often, travel by bicycle, 
or visit their physicians regularly. The pool of the traditional 
insurer (which has been abandoned by the low-risk clients 
seeking discounts) now features a higher average risk. Some 
amount of adverse selection has taken place. The insurer is 
now operating below costs, as the average cost of claims 
went up. The insurer can either (a) raise the premiums to all 
clients to avoid insolvency or (b) offer cheaper surveillance 
products to attract low-risk clients and raise the premiums 
of other clients to compensate for the missing revenues. 
However, (a) will create an incentive for even more low-
risk clients to search for alternatives, so the only sustainable 
solution is (b).
Announcing the intention to change the insured’s terms 
and conditions in the way specified by (b) cannot be con-
sidered a threat. The announcement should be framed as a 
warning: a mere description of the subject’s options, which 
the insurer gives to the client, independently of the insurer’s 
intention to make it less desirable for the client to keep sur-
veillance data private. If the insurer truly must only permit 
less attractive options now, for example, raise insurance 
prices in the absence of certain data (for example, to avoid 
adverse selection), the insurer merely announces what the 
options are. Its announcement is a warning, not a threat.
The same announcement is a threat when the insurer 
raises prices in order to make the option of not sharing data 
less desirable for the client (for example, it is not necessary 
to have these data to prevent adverse selection and ensure 
financial sustainability). In the threat scenario, the insurer 
could have sustainably maintained traditional products 
(involving no digital surveillance) at the same (or normally 
expected) price while offering digital surveillance products 
to others at a lower price. But the insurer wants to build 
data assets and chooses to raise the premiums of all clients 
who do not share data from digital surveillance sources as 
a means to that goal.
A threat that can be avoided and does not coerce still 
counts as a threat. Suppose that a customer could avoid this 
threat by turning to a competitor with a preferable offer. 
There is no coercion in this case. Suppose that, instead, the 
customer is too lazy or busy to find an alternative. He or 
she decides to give in, wear a step-counter, and share its 
data. The choice still counts as coerced, despite the existing 
alternative options with a different insurer.
The difference between the insurer issuing a warning and 
the insurer who threatens to coerce corresponds to the differ-
ence between the two owners in the unionization example. It 
is the distinction between threats and warnings. What makes 
the options provided by a second insurer a threat is the fact 
that the insurer intends that the client cannot get traditional 
insurance at the normally expected price without sharing 
new data.14
Consider an insurer who leaves the premiums of existing 
clients intact but begins to offer insurance at a different, 
discounted price to those clients who agree to use a step-
counter or a geo-locating mechanism and share their digital 
surveillance data. This pricing structure counts as an offer, 
not a threat, because the client gains further options from 
the insurer, and existing options are left intact. The client’s 
freedom expands, or at worst, does not shrink. Clients who 
switch from the old product to this new product cannot be 
said to have been coerced.
The slight complication introduced here is the idea of 
a status quo baseline not defined by constant prices. This 
baseline is not the relevant one, for example, because of 
inflation or changes in variable risk factors of the client that 
the existing insurance contracts already consider, such as 
age. The status quo baseline should be defined by reason-
able expectations forming the background of any prior com-
mercial agreement between client and insurer, in particular, 
those clearly stated in the contract. The status quo relevant to 
assess if the condition offered by a new product is a threat or 
an offer is not simply the premium actually paid in the past 
with old products. It is defined by the reasonably expected 
status quo: the premium that a reasonable client expects to 
pay, given the normally expected course of events. It is nor-
mal that premiums vary, reflecting both exogenous causes 
(inflation or variations in the overall expected cost of the 
risk pool) or endogenous ones (age and other risk factors).
In summary, necessary and sufficient conditions to call 
the manipulation of commercial products available to clients 
“coercion to accept digital surveillance insurance plans” are:
14 In practice, it will be difficult for clients to determine if a given 
announcement states, in reality, a warning or a threat. The insurer has 
a reputational reason to mask threats as mere warnings.
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(a) The insurer wants the client to accept digital surveil-
lance;
(b) the insurer has historically offered insurance products 
that do not involve surveillance (traditional products), 
with fairly predictable prices, grounding reasonable 
expectations of what the normal price for them would 
be;
(c) the insurer announces that it will raise the premiums of 
all those clients who have not purchased surveillance 
plans;
(d) the increased price of traditional products is higher 
than expected, even discounting for exogenous eco-
nomic factors and fluctuating personal features known 
to affect premiums;
(e) it is not the case that, when market conditions have 
changed the risk pool of the insurer (for example, 
lower-risk individuals leaving the pool), the insurer 
has to raise prices for sustainability reasons;
(f) the insurer does not have to raise the price due to legal 
requirements or stringent moral obligations15;
(g) the insured purchases the product involving surveil-
lance to avoid paying a higher premium.
In the example above, coercion violates the client’s auton-
omy to accept or avoid digital surveillance by the insurer.
The distinction underpinning the threat/warning distinc-
tion depends on the distinction between a discretionary (but 
still profit-affecting) business decision (intended to make 
refusals to share data less desirable for the client) and a deci-
sion that a business must make. One may doubt that the 
underlying distinction is tenable. In many cases, it will be 
hard to determine if a choice is avoidable.
Yet we believe the distinction is tenable, even though it 
is often difficult to apply to concrete cases. A parallel will 
be made with assessments of an agent’s virtue for which no 
clear-cut criteria exist and require examining habitual dis-
positions of the agent, involving behavior about the agent’s 
past, that are often hardly accessible to casual acquaint-
ances (Everett et al. 2006). Similarly, the complexity of a 
company’s life, and the path-dependency of its choices and 
strategies, will often make it difficult to assess if a price 
increase of non-surveillance-based options is unavoidable 
(for example, for prices to be actuarially fair and avoid 
adverse selection in the insurance pool) or intended to pro-
duce an effect on the client’s willingness to contribute to 
insurer data assets. In some cases, only insiders will be able 
to tell. In many cases, even insiders will disagree on whether 
a choice to raise the prices of some products was the only, or 
best, option enabling long-term stability and the repayment 
of all claims and obligations in a competitive, transforming 
environment.
As with actions realizing virtues, we can point to the 
existence of some clear-cut cases, those in which the exec-
utives of a company agree that a certain choice is either 
optional or required.16
Another objection is that some businesses may view profit 
maximization as an imperative and the only relevant moral 
imperative for firms (Friedman 2007). If this view is cor-
rect, profit-maximizing insurers cannot threaten their clients. 
Notice, however, that the view “if it is imperative for firms 
to maximize their profits, profit-maximizing insurers can-
not threaten their clients” is not incompatible with the view 
defended here because it is simply an application of this 
view. Our view is logically compatible with the view that 
profit maximization is an imperative because, if that con-
tentious general premise is true, then the proposal to raise 
the prices for clients who do not share data is a conditional 
warning in the case that is necessary to maximize profits. 
Even in that case, threats are possible. For example, sup-
pose that raising the premium of clients who do not share 
their data is not a profit-maximizing strategy. Management 
knows this, and yet it raises premiums to build data assets. 
Managers do this for the sake of signaling that the com-
pany is aggressively pursuing innovative strategies, which is 
expected to cause a short-term rise in stock prices, resulting 
in an end-of-year bonus. Managers do not increase premiums 
for the sake of maximizing long-term shareholder value but 
their own short-term gain. The conditional proposal should 
be classified as a threat, even if the contentious assumption 
above about profit maximization is granted. On the other 
hand, if there is no imperative for firms to maximize profits 
(Freeman 2010), there could be different circumstances in 
which companies threaten clients.
15 When legal or moral requirements provide the insurer with con-
clusive reasons to raise premiums, the announced raise in prices is 
a warning. This can be judged by analogy with the example of the 
teacher in the preceding section.
16 Moreover, certain forms of path-dependency can be assessed mor-
ally, and the definition of threats used here can be adapted as needed 
to include those more complex cases. For example, if at time t you 
can predict that by doing F at t you will put yourself in a position at 
t + n where you must do G (e.g., raising the premium of a customer 
who does not share data), G counts as avoidable to the extent that any 
feasible alternative to F not leading to G (compatible with the sur-
vival of the firm and overriding moral and legal duties) exists at t. It 
is not our purpose here, however, to provide a theory that solves all 
moral puzzles of path-dependency.
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Privacy, Autonomy, and the Harm of Being 
Coerced into Surveillance
In this paper, we define the privacy of a person X as a 
restriction for third persons to access the self of X (includ-
ing information about the self). We focus on privacy when 
it is valued as a constituent or contributor to the spontane-
ity, authenticity and autonomy of X. Our definition builds 
on traditional accounts of privacy (Bok 1984; Bloustein 
2003; Gavison 1984) that are widely discussed in the pri-
vacy literature. We note that our definition is incompatible 
with others that are considered equally important (e.g., 
Solove 2002; Moore 2003; Nissenbaum 2004). Moreover, 
our definition covers less ground (and not necessarily the 
same ground) as social-norms-based (contextual) concep-
tions of privacy (Solove 2002; Moore 2003; Nissenbaum 
2004). We ignore the latter because we do not need to 
claim that our conception of privacy is the only right one. 
We do not appeal to privacy as an independent norma-
tive premise of this argument independent of autonomy, 
spontaneity and authenticity. We simply use ‘privacy’ as 
a shorthand for a condition of “limited access to the self 
(including information about the self)” when we discuss 
how this condition is affected by a coerced choice and 
affects other goods. Notice that autonomy plays two dis-
tinct roles in our argument: first, autonomy is that which 
is violated when the client is coerced to give up privacy. 
In this sense, the distinct wrong of coercion is that it fails 
to respect autonomy, and this wrong is independent of the 
value of privacy. (Coercion would also be wrong as the 
violation of the autonomous choice to play tennis.) Sec-
ond, autonomy gives the individual reasons to value his 
or her own privacy (a condition of restricted access to the 
self) instrumentally. In this case, privacy is valued as a 
means to autonomy. Arguably, the goods of spontaneity 
and authenticity provide similar reasons. We develop both 
arguments below.
Some individuals value privacy for its own sake. When 
this happens, privacy can be an aspect of an autono-
mously (or spontaneously, or authentically) chosen life. 
In this respect, privacy is conceived in itself the object 
of a choice, which can be autonomous, spontaneous, and 
authentic, not a means to or enabling condition of further 
choices. For example, the intrinsic value of privacy may 
amount to this: individuals may not want to expose certain 
aspects of their lives to other people, irrespective of the 
consequences. Individuals may be uncomfortable with the 
idea of being seen, heard, perceived, or recorded, even by 
a machine, in certain circumstances (Westin 1967).
Furthermore, privacy is valuable instrumentally, for the 
sake of making autonomous (or spontaneous, or authentic) 
choices about other aspects of life. In this case, privacy 
is the condition of or means to a choice about something 
other than privacy. The instrumental value of privacy is 
explained more easily by presenting some common con-
sequences of lacking it. People lacking privacy are more 
vulnerable to costs imposed by others if they behave in 
particular ways. There are also indirect costs for spontane-
ity and authenticity if individuals act less authentically or 
spontaneously because they fear such costs. If authenticity 
or spontaneity are enabling conditions of human dignity 
and individuality (Bloustein 2003) or enabling conditions 
of authentic friendship and love, and if friendship and 
love are objective elements of well-being (Griffin 1986), 
authenticity and spontaneity are also valuable for those 
reasons. In other words, even when privacy is not valued 
for its own sake, it may be valued as a condition of some-
thing else, which is.
So, the first argument against coercion to adopt digital 
surveillance for insurance purposes is that it disrespects a 
preference for privacy. When that desire expresses the auton-
omy of the individual, this is pro tanto morally wrong, as 
argued in Sect. 4. The second argument against coercion to 
adopt digital surveillance is that it destroys a condition that 
protects autonomy and favors spontaneity and authenticity. 
This argument is independent of digital surveillance being 
coerced. The result of losing privacy is morally bad (pro 
tanto) in that it (1) generates further risks of coercion, which 
is always pro tanto wrong, and (2) reduces the opportunity 
for express autonomy, authenticity and spontaneity in other 
choices. The rest of this section deals with arguments (1) 
and (2).
Let us start by considering: (1) the loss of privacy as 
exposure to potential coercion. Individuals are exposed to 
coercion because of a lack of privacy resulting from their 
acceptance of digital surveillance. A person who is willing 
to constantly generate and record some digital phenotype, 
such as wearing a fitness tracker with GPS, is exposed to 
new threats. For example, once an insurer has surveillance 
data, the insurer may threaten to raise premiums (relative 
to the normally expected prices) if the client does not adopt 
some required risk-reduction activities or is not willing to 
demonstrate them through accessible digital phenotypes.
Further violations of autonomy result from threats that 
other agents can make when they know that digital pheno-
types are generated and recorded. For example, an employer 
may threaten the employee, or a husband may threaten the 
wife, to be given access to data shared with insurers. For 
example, the employer may be able to mine these data to 
infer how much time an employee spends in front of a com-
puter, and a jealous husband may be able to know how much 
time his wife spends outside the home. Once that threat is 
accepted, further threats exploiting the surveilled activities 
are enabled; for example, the employer and the jealous hus-
band may coerce the employee and the wife to act in desired 
 M. Loi et al.
1 3
ways through further threats. By showing that a privacy loss 
generated risks of further coercion when it was uncoerced, 
we show that non-coercive processes leading to a loss of 
options for privacy-valuing clients generate risks of further 
autonomy violations that are potential pro tanto wrongs. 
This is the premise of the argument provided in “Privacy 
erosion from non-coercive insurance market transactions” 
section, dealing with privacy erosion from non-coercive 
market transactions. In addition to being instrumentally 
valuable as a protection of autonomy, privacy is valuable 
as a means to spontaneity and authenticity. Individuals who 
accept digital surveillance because of threats, offers, or 
warnings may later find out that they are no longer able to 
act spontaneously or authentically. Such long-term harmful 
effects of losing privacy may be hard to foresee when clients 
autonomously choose surveillance.
One could object that some clients are made better off 
by such “offers”, that is, cases in which sharing data lowers 
the premium, while the refusal to share data raises it, rela-
tive to the expected status quo. These, as a result, do not 
count as threats against them. Some clients have nothing to 
hide because they know they are low risk (they are already 
very physically active, for example). They may not have an 
intrinsic aversion to being tracked, as long as observation 
by actual human eyes is ruled out. And, for this client, the 
appeal of a discount may be sufficient to motivate him or her 
to share digital surveillance data with the insurer.
In response, let us consider whether even clients who 
do not value their privacy intrinsically may have reasons to 
value their privacy instrumentally as a protection from the 
counterfactual interference of the insurer (De Bruin 2010), 
which amounts to protection of their freedom (De Bruin 
2010).17
To explain this value of privacy, consider a client who 
values the option of paying a low premium and does not 
value privacy intrinsically. That is, this client does not dis-
like being surveilled, as such. A proposal framed as “you 
pay less than before if sharing digital surveillance data 
and you pay more than before if not sharing it” is an offer 
because the proposal augments the client’s valued options, 
that is, provides lower premiums and does not prevent access 
to any valued option, as the client does not care whether 
surveillance is in place. So, this arrangement does not count 
as a threat.
Let us consider how this changes the client’s access to 
other options in counterfactual scenarios. For example, 
before being digitally surveilled, the client could freely 
decide to stop doing many physical activities without suf-
fering a rise in premiums. Now, after accepting digital 
surveillance, the client who decides to no longer do physi-
cal activities must pay a higher price reflecting his or her 
increased risk. The previously existing option of not doing 
frequent physical activities is now counterfactually blocked 
by a threat. It is not blocked in the sense that the previously 
existing non-digital-surveillance option is no longer offered, 
and it is not blocked in the sense that it is made inaccessible 
by the direct imposition of physical force (that is, no one 
physically takes the client to the gym). Yet, the option is now 
counterfactually blocked by coercion: were the client to stop 
doing a lot of physical activity with a surveillance-based 
option, he or she would be required to pay a higher premium, 
were the client to return to a non-surveillance-based option, 
he or she would be required to pay a higher premium. When 
this rise in prices is intended by the insurer to make those 
options less desirable for the client (as required by 3*), the 
counterfactual interference of the insurer takes the form of 
a counterfactual threat.18
Summing up: a deal where sharing data lowers the pre-
mium, but refusing to share data raises it, relative to the 
expected status quo, counts as an offer for a client who does 
not value privacy intrinsically, exercises frequently, and is 
sufficiently motivated to share data by the discount. And 
yet, it can reduce the client’s freedom (De Bruin 2010). 
This freedom loss occurs when the digitally surveilled cli-
ent would (counterfactually) be threatened to avoid physi-
cal inactivity. More generally, the example shows that the 
instrumental value of privacy also consists in protecting the 
client’s freedom understood as freedom from counterfactual 
interference (De Bruin 2010).
According to the first line of argument, the threat of the 
insurer is wrong because, when accepted, it amounts to coer-
cion, which is pro tanto wrong, being a violation of the cli-
ent’s autonomy. According to the second line of argument, 
the increased cost of privacy-friendly options (whether 
coerced or uncoerced) is pro tanto harmful when it enables 
the insurer or third parties to coerce the client. In the latter 
case, the increased cost of privacy makes protecting auton-
omy, spontaneity and authenticity costlier and it reduces 
the client’s freedom. The next section examines a plausible 
scenario of the evolution of insurance models favoring the 
adoption of digital surveillance through non-coercive means.
17 De Bruin (2010) characterizes this freedom as “negative”, defined 
as the concept according to which “I am unfree to perform some 
action, A, if someone interferes with my performance of A or if 
someone has the disposition to interfere with my performance of A 
if I were to attempt to perform A” (p. 511). The freedom in question 
here can be labeled “negative” only if interference in this definition 
includes threats. It cannot be labeled “negative” if negative freedom 
reflects only physical impossibility and excludes threats (Steiner 
1994).
18 Unless it is something the insurer must do, in which case it counts 
as a warning.
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Privacy Erosion from Non‑coercive Insurance 
Market Transactions
In this section, we describe a possible, and at least not 
unlikely, social process that reduces freedom, that is, elimi-
nates valued conjunctive options for privacy-valuing indi-
viduals. The case we describe here deserves to be discussed 
in detail because it does not qualify as coercion and yet 
causes a freedom loss. This loss of freedom makes privacy 
costlier to obtain or maintain, and in this way, generates 
further threats against autonomy. This example helps us to 
answer the question of whether, in the absence of coercive 
threats by insurers, the introduction of digital surveillance is 
morally problematic, and at least pro tanto morally wrong, 
and if so, why.
We shall suppose here that the first insurer to introduce 
personalized premiums based on digital surveillance is a 
new market player offering only digital surveillance plans. 
Because such a player has no pre-existing clients on tra-
ditional plans, this insurer cannot be accused of threaten-
ing clients into sharing data. The insurer may tempt clients 
to share their data with strong discounts, but according to 
our analysis, that only counts as an offer, not as a threat. 
From the client’s perspective, a new company offering new 
products can only represent a gain in freedom: it is either 
a benefit or at worst neutral. So, no coercion via threats is 
involved at this stage.
Now suppose that new players entering the market obtain 
the former lowest-risk customers from traditional insurers. 
Thus, traditional insurers will either have to raise the premi-
ums to all clients or also start discriminating (in, let us sup-
pose, actuarially fair ways) between high-risk and low-risk 
clients, in ways that require collecting surveillance data to 
discern more granular risk pools. This requirement means 
that, eventually, the clients may end up receiving the follow-
ing offer: either pay higher premiums than before or share 
more data than before. This offer resembles a threat, and 
certainly, it is not an offer because it involves worse options 
than the status quo. At closer inspection, this is not a threat 
either, if the company, as described, is merely adjusting its 
prices to avoid adverse selection and the risk of insolvency.19 
In the scenario we are considering, traditional insurers at a 
certain stage must adopt this policy to survive and fulfill 
their ethical duties to their clients. The offer, therefore, quali-
fies as a warning under the classification we propose.
The process we have described at no point involves 
threats by insurers to obtain more data. However, the mar-
ket reduces the freedom of those clients who are, as a result, 
exposed to further (counterfactual) threats. This process 
starts with new players offering lower prices, clients accept-
ing new forms of surveillance, and ends up with traditional 
insurers warning clients who do not accept such surveillance 
that premiums will become higher than they were reasonably 
expected to become.
The end result of this process is that privacy-valuing 
customers suffer a loss of freedom that is achieved with-
out coercion by insurers. When assessing this scenario, one 
can focus on the process or the outcome. The process is 
not morally objectionable from the viewpoint of autonomy 
because the autonomy of the client is not violated by con-
ditional offers and conditional warnings. The outcome of 
the process is, however, morally objectionable, at least pro 
tanto, because it exposes the individual to further threats, so 
it makes it harder for individuals to resist further attempts 
of coercion by insurers or other agents. Digital surveillance 
creates risks of pro tanto moral wrongs. In a sense, the sce-
nario described here is inimical to autonomy. But the client’s 
autonomy is not violated by the insurer’s offer (warnings) for 
clients accepting (refusing) surveillance. Rather, the effect 
of the insurers’ and clients’ spontaneous, uncoordinated, and 
often autonomous actions make autonomy costlier to protect 
for insurance clients in general. Moreover, the outcome of 
the process is also morally objectionable because it increases 
the cost of protecting authenticity and spontaneity, if these 
are valuable, as argued in Sect. 5. This provides insurers, cli-
ents, and regulators pro tanto reasons to avoid this outcome 
that are independent of the moral wrongness of coercion by 
insurers to accept digital surveillance.
Further Research
In what follows, we highlight possibilities for further ethi-
cal research that result from this analysis of privacy and 
autonomy outcomes resulting from threats, offers, and warn-
ings leading clients to accept digital surveillance by insurers.
One question to research is whether, given a collective 
responsibility of insurers to generate an equilibrium in which 
protecting autonomy, authenticity, and spontaneity becomes 
costlier, insurers have moral duties to avoid contributing to 
it. Another question is whether consumers have a moral duty 
to avoid taking conditional offers for cheaper insurance in 
exchange for data. For both questions, if the end result of the 
process is morally wrong all-things-considered, one could 
explore a rule-consequentialist argument that prohibits cer-
tain choices that would contribute to such outcomes.
A third question is whether regulators have duties to pre-
vent this process from happening, that is, all-things-consid-
ered reasons to interfere with market transactions, through 
sanctions. Notice that sanctions also imply a loss of freedom. 
For example, enforcing regulations against conditional offers 
reduces the freedom of clients who favor or are indifferent 
19 Or maintain reasonable profitability margins to avoid de-capitali-
zation, preventing long-term operations.
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to digital monitoring and would otherwise have made small 
savings. A utilitarian regulator should prohibit conditional 
offers only if the loss of freedom for some, accompanied by 
the gain of freedom by others, produces a utility gain overall. 
We do not have any empirical evidence backing one or the 
other alternative.
From the viewpoint of autonomy-based liberalism (Blake 
2001), it may be argued the expansion of digital surveillance 
undermines general conditions for individual autonomy that 
ought to be preserved for all individuals, even those who do 
not value it. Such a regulator should claim that even individ-
uals who voluntarily adopt digital surveillance face a serious 
risk of losing their autonomy, spontaneity, or authenticity 
with respect to other choices made under insurance surveil-
lance. The latter is the greatest wrong. Protecting the general 
conditions for autonomy from a potentially indefinite expan-
sion of digital surveillance may justify the interference of 
the state with (even non-coercive) market exchanges (Blake 
2001; Raz 1986; Rawls 1980). A liberal regulator, in this 
perspective, has reasons to limit the freedom of clients who 
want digital surveillance, that is, to prohibit conditional 
offers involving digital surveillance, when facing a serious 
risk that privacy-friendly products will become more expen-
sive for those who want them at a later stage.20 Our analysis 
reveals the following dilemma: is the certain immediate free-
dom loss of consumers who do not value privacy, implied by 
preventing the trade between privacy and small savings on 
premiums, a morally worse state of affairs, from the point of 
view of autonomy, than the risk of uninterrupted incremen-
tal exposure to digital surveillance (as argued here, a risk 
factor for further coercion) that this regulation is supposed 
to prevent? We hope scholars from various disciplines will 
contribute to answering this question.
Conclusion
In this essay, we have argued for three theses involving 
insurance threats, privacy, and autonomy. First, coercion to 
share private data with insurers is pro tanto wrong because 
it is a violation of the client’s autonomy. Second, we main-
tain that being coerced into sharing data for insurance sur-
veillance exposes the client to further threats and autonomy 
losses, and consequently, to the risk of living a less autono-
mous, spontaneous, and authentic life. Third, we point out 
that regulators may have reasons to oppose the contraction 
of freedom generated by digital surveillance, irrespective 
of whether clients were coerced into accepting it. All our 
arguments are pro tanto. One could accept our pro tanto 
argument and still argue that an unregulated market is ultima 
facie morally justified, for example, on efficiency and fair-
ness grounds. Our analysis of the outcomes of non-coercive 
market transactions leading to the acceptance of digital 
surveillance opens further moral questions that there is not 
space here to address. We hope that this conclusion will 
stimulate other scholars to further research the topic.
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